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Private lmvestment  often goes through three phases under adjust-
ment programs: initial contraction (a period of one to two years),
a long pause (for three to five years), and sustained recovery. The
length of the investment pause is longer for low-income coun-
tries, and the cycle of public investment is of greater amplitude
than the cycle of private investment. The paper discusses the
roles of macroeconomic restraint, coordination failures, value of
waiting, and lack of supportive infrastructure in generating these
cycles of investment.
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sustained  recovery.  In characterizing  the cycles  of investment,
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Economic reform, involving the reshaping of incentives and institutions,
is a long and time-consuming process.  Moreover, this reform is often
punctuated with adverse external shocks, stubborn stabilization, and political
setbacks, so that the build-up of domestic confidence takes time.  In many
countries, the slow recover% of private (let alone public) investment despite
a decisive move to market-o- anted reform, !.a  increasingly evident in
adjustment.  In addition, a  utback in public investment throughout the
eighties, part of it complementary with private investment, has been amply
documented (see Faini and de Melo 1990; Serven and Solimano 1991).
These are worrisome trends.  For economic adjustment to be sustainable,
it needs to be accompanied by an increase in capital formation and prodactive
capacities.
This paper takes a close look at the cycle of private investment that
seems to take place during adjustment programs: for economies in a period of
expansion before adjustment, initially private investment contracts following
the adoption of the adjustment program, a contraction that may last between
one and two years; then, in the second phase, private investment reaches a
plateau characterized by the absence of any substantial increase (or further
decline) in private investment, a period of investment depression that may
last three or more years; then in the third phase, a more or less sustained
increase in private investment occurs.
The experiences of countries undertaking economic reform reviewed in
this paper show that it takes a  half a decade or mora for a reforming economy
to resume growth, (albeit modest in some cases), while although in more
problematic cases, e.g., Bolivia or Ghana, the recovery of investment and
growth may take longer.
The next section of this paper looks at private and public investment
rates in developing countries for the period 1970-89 to identify whether some
significant reversal in the depressed trends of investment took place in the
second half of the 1980s.  Section 3 offers an analytical overview of the
impact of adjustment and reform policies on private investment.  In section 4,2
an analysis  of the performance  of private  investment  --  in  particular  the
shape  and  timing  of the investment  cycle  described  before  --  is carried  out
for  Chile,  Mexico,  Thailand,  Bolivia  and  Ghana,  all  economies  that have
pursued  comprehensive  macro  stabilization  and liberalization  policies,  which
are  the core  of the reform  programs  recommended  by the Bretton  Woods
institutions.  The  paper  closes  in section  5 with some  final  remarks  and
highlights  of the  policy  conclusions.
2.  Investment  in  Developing  Countries.  1970-89:  A Look at  the Numbers
Gross  capital  formation  in developing  countries  slowed  down sharply
after  the  outbreak  of the  debt crisis  in 1982  and  remained  depressed
throughout  the rest  of the  decade  (table  1).1 This  trend  holds  for  both
public  and  private  investment  for  the  whole  group  of developing  countries,
though  a recovery  in  private  investment  started  to take  place  since  1987 (see
figure  1).  In contrast,  public  investment  rates  continued  to decline
throughout  the  decade.  In 1989  the ratio  of public  investment  to  GDP was
almost  3  points  below  its  average  level  of the seventies. Total  investment  in
the second  half of the  eighties  did not  increase,  on average,  with respect  to
1982-84. Towards  the  end  of the  decade,  fixed  capital  formation  was still
below  its level  of a decade  before (figure  1).
At a regional  level,  private  investment  rates  slightly  recovered  in
Latin  America  in  the period  1985-89  compared  to 1982-84,  while  remaining
relatively  flat in  Asia and  Sub-Saharan  Af.-  As a share  of GDP private
investment  was higher  in  Asia than in Latin  erica  or in Sub-Saharan  Africa
throughout  the eighties. This latter  region  consistently  had  the lowest
levels  of private  investment.
Within  Asia,  the group  of south-eastern  countries  ,Korea,  Thailand,  Malaysia,
Indonesia)  out-performed  the  rest  of the  region  in terms  of higher  private
investment  rates (and  growth)  throughout  the  period.
As Figure  1  shows,  the  incipient  recovery  of private  investment  after
1987 suggests  a lag  of more than  five  years  in the investment  response  after
the adjustment  measures  of the early-eighties  --  certainly  a quite  delayed3
Table I
PRIVATE  AND PUBLIC  INVESPMENT  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRES. 197049
(as percent of GDP)
Investment  Rate  1970-81  1982-84  1985-89
Al  Sample
Private  12.2  10.G  9.9
Public  9.7  9.0  7.4
Total  21.9  19.6  17.3
lAtin America I/
Private  I 1.8  8.9  9.2
Public  8.1  7.3  6.1
Total  19.9  16.2  15.3
Asia 2/
Private  15.4  16.4  14.0
Public  8.9  10.8  8.5
Total  24.3  27.2  22.5
Sub-Saharan  Africa  _I
Private  10.1  7.4  7.2
Publc  11.2  7.9  7.1
Total  21.3  15.3  14.3
Source: Pfeffermann  and Madarany (1990)  and BESD  World  Bank. The  averages  are unweighted  and include 41 developing  countries.
1/  Argentina, Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile, Colombia,  Cosa Rica, Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador, El Salvadot,  Guatemala,  Guyana,  Haiti,
Mexico, Paraguay,  Peru, Uruguay,  Venezuela.
V'  Bangladesh,  India,  Indonesia,  Republic  of Kore,  Malaysia,  Pskistan, Papua  New Guinea, Philippines,  Sri Lanka,  Thailand.
_/  Cote d'lvoue, Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Kenya, Malawi,  Mauritius,  Nigeria,  Tanzania, Zaire, Zimbabwe.
Other  countries  included  in the sample  are  Hungary,  Tunisia and Turkey.4
Figure  1
REAL PRIVATE  AND PUBLIC  INVESTMENT
IN  )EVELOPING  COUNTRIES,  1979-1989.
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Source: Pf@tferman  and Madarasey  (1990)response. Moreover,  the  post-1987  recovery  is still  modest. In turn,  the
continuing  Cecline  of public  investment  represents  a  worrisome  trend  that
suggeets  %n increased  scrapping  of public  infrastructure  with adverse
implications  for  medium-term  growth  dnd for  private  capital  accumulation  am
well,  given  the complementarity  relationship  between  both  types  of investment.
3.  AdLustmen&  Policies  and  Private  Investment:  An Analytica?  overvie
A program  of economic  adjustment  has  two  main components:  (i)
macroeconomic  adjustment  and stabilization;  and (L)  structural  reforms  or
liberalization.  Macroeconomic  adjustment  aims  to correct  large  macroeconomic
imbalances  such  as unsustainable  fiscal  and/or  current  account  deficito. In
countries  with high and/or  erratic  inflation,  stabilization  policies  are  also
implemented. Structural  adjustment  (or  liberalization)  involves  policies  to
improve  the functioning  of markets,  open  the economy  to foreign  competition,
remove  mic-oeconomic  distortions  and  change  the  regulatory  environment  the
private  sector  faces.  How these  policies  may  affect  investment  is  examined
next.
3.1  Macroeconomic  Ad1ustment  and  Stabilization 1
An  (unsustainable)  current  account  deficit  --  the  basic  imbalance  that
leads  a  country  to  go  to  an  international  lending  institution  --  entails
an excess  of ii,estment  over domestic  savings  (or  an excess  of domestic
absoLptLon  over  output). Cutting  an external  imbalance  therefore  requires  a
cut  in investment  relative  to savings. Not surprisingly,  initially  investment
may fall  during  adjustment  unless  moat of the adjustment  is accomplished
through  increased  domestic  savings. The  balancing  of fiscal  accounts  also
requires  an increase  of revenues  over spending. Very  often  the cut in
spending  by the public  sector  takes  the  form  of  a  cut  in  capital  expenditures.
I  A thorough  survey  of the literature  on macroeconomic  adjustment  and
private inventment  can  be found  in Serven  and  Solimano  (1992).6
Moreover,  macroeconomic  stabilization,  including  tight  monetary  and  credit
policies,  will have  an adverse  short-run  effect  on private  investment.
Restrictive  Demand  Policies
Restrictive  monetary  and  credit  policies  are,  in  many cases,  used  au a
substitute  for  fiscal  adjustment  to curb inflation. Tight  money and  credit
adversely  affects  private  investment  through  the  higher  real  cost  of bank
credit  and/or  directly  through  the stock  of real  credit  available  to firms.
Some  empirical  studies  of investment  in  LDCU  have found  that  the real interest
rate has  a direct  effect  on investment  while  others  do not. 2 In the
repressed  financial  markets  that characterize  many  ICs,  credit  policy  affects
investment  directly  through  the  stock  of credit  available  to firms  with access
to preferential  interest  rates  rather  than through  the indirect  interest  rate
channel. Firms  without  access  to subsidized  credit  are  often  forced  to cancel
some investment  projects  because  of a lack  of outside  financing,  to borrow  in
the  unofficial  money  market  and/or  to finance  investment  through  retained
profits. Whatever  the  transmission  mechanism  of monetary  and  credit  policy,
the evidence  suggests  that tight  credit  policies  cause  aggregate  spending  to
reduue  chiefly  through  a cut in  private  investment.
The correction  of fiscal  deficits  is a cornerstone  of any adjustment
program.  In general  high  fiscal  deficits  tend  to crowd  out  private  investment
through  the  higher  real  interest  rates  associated  with  increased  government
debt.  Moreover,  fiscal  deficits  financed  through  money creation  hamper
private  capital  formation,  as (high)  inflation  is a powerful  deterrent  to
investment  because  af its  adverse  effects  on macroeconomic  stability.
Thus,  correcting  fiscal  deficits  helps  promote  private  investment.
However,  private  investment  may suffer  in  the transition  period  if the  fiscal
adjubtment  involves  cutting  complementary  public  inveuitment.  There  is
2 Studies  finding  a significant  effect  of the real intarest  rate  or the
cost  of capital  on investment  are  de Molo and  Tybout  (1990),  Greene  and
Villanueva  (1990)  and  Solimano  (1990). Studies  finding  a significant  impact
of the stock  of real  credit  on investment  demand  are van  Wijnbergen  (1982),
Blejor  and Kahn (1984),  Lim (1987)  and  Dailami  (1990).7
increasing  empirical  evidence  from  both individual  country  studies  as well as
a cross-section  analysis  of the  complementarity  relationships  between  public
investment  (mainly  in infrastructure  ouch  as roads,  ports,  telecommunications)
and  private  investment  (see  Blejer  and  Kahn 1984;  Faini  and de  Melo 1990;
Greene  and  Villanueva  1990;  and  Serven  and  Solimano  1992).
Empirical  studies  of investment  behavior  in LDCU  show  that investment
responds  strongly  to changes  in  output.  Interpreting  this  evidence  as a
short-term  relationship  (when  the caunality  goes from  output  to investment)
highlights  the fact  that restrictive  demand  policies  that induce  a recession
and  increase  idle  capacity  in the  economy  are likely  to have an adverse  short-
run impact  on private  investment. 3
The initial  downturn  in  economic  activity  often  associated  with
macroeconomic  adjustment  may also  affect  investment  through  its  effect  on
expectations.  In fact,  a current  recession  could  form  the  basis  for
"pessimistic"  expectations  that lead  investors  to postpone  investment  until
the  recovery  arrives;  this  delay  in  turn  may prevent  the  take-off  of
investment  (particularly  for  projects  with short  gestation  lags)  and  delay  the
recovery  itself. In this case,  the  economy  may get stuck  in a low investment
equilibrium  because  of insufficient  investment  arising  from  self-fulfilling
pessimism. Avoiding  such  an outcome  is an important  consideration  in  the
design  of restrictive  demand  policies  that  minimize  their  adverse  impact  on
investment  and  growth.
3  The profitability  of investment  (the  ratio  of the  market  value  of
investment  with respect  to replacement  costs)  tends  to be highly  procyclical.
It increases  in  upturns  and  falls  in  downturns;  see  Soltmano  (1989)  for
evidence  in Chile.- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8
Excnange  Rate Policy
An important  ingredient  of most  adjustment  programs  is  a  real
devaluation  of the  exchange  rate  aimed  at reducing  external  imbalances  and
promoting  export  and import-competing  activities. In  the 1980e  many LDCs
undertook  sharp  real  dep  eciations  of the  exchange  rate  as part  of their
adjustment  to the debt  crisis. A real  depreciation  may affect  both  the level
and  composition  of private  investment. 4 It  affects  the level  cf  pr..vate
investment  through  two  main channelsat  the real  4nterest  rate (or  the  real
stock  of credit)  and  real  output.
A devaluation  often  raises  the  price  level  and  depresses  real  balances
(unless  monetary  policy  is fully  accommodative,  pushing  up the real lnterast
rate  up and investment  down).  In a similar  way, a devaluation  may reduce  the
real stock  of credit  and lead  to a decline  in investment  through  a direct
credit  crunch  effect. Conversely,  if the  devaluation  was anticipated  and it
eliminates  the  expectations  of a  devaluation,  domestic  real interest  rates
will fall  and investment  increase.
These  two  conflicting  results  are  relevant  in  differ'mnt  settings. The
former  outcome  is more likely  in an economy  with a closed  capital  account,
while  tha second  is more  relevant  in  an economy  with high capital  mobility,
where  the  domestic  interest  rates  reflect  the international  rates,  country
risk  and  expectations  of devaluation.
A second  channel  through  which  devaluation  may affect  the level  of
investment  is  its  impact  on  aggregate  demand.  The  literature  on
contractionary  devaluation  (Krugman  and  Taylor  1978;  van  Wijnbergen  1986;
Solimano  1986;  EAw'ards  1987;  and  Lizondo  and  Montiel  1989)  emphasizes  that the
impact  of  a  real  devaluation  on aggregate  demand  is dominated  by its  adverse
income  effects  rather  than by its substit%J  on effects (which  tend to be weak
in  the  -hort  te  ).  A  contraction  in  aggregate  demand  may  come  from  a
redistribition  from  wage  earners  (low  savers)  to  profit  recipients  (high
4 A real  depreciation  may  also  have  potentially  important  effects  on  the
timing  of investment,  depending  on the finar.cial  openness  of the  economy  and
the import  content  of capital  goods (Dornbusch  1986  and Serven  1990).9
savers)  and  also from  real ineome  transfere  abroad,  if the  devaluation  takes
pla&c  when  there is a  trade  deficit. 5 If  the net  effect  of a  currency
devaluation  ia contractionary,  then  the slump  in  economic  activity  ia likely
tco  'iad  investors  to  cut  investment  spending.  However,  the  contractionary
dev6luatien  is  more likely  to be short-term. Ira  the  medlum  rur.  when real
exports  to  pick  up  after  a  real  devaluation,  an  expansionary  outcome  for
output  and  investment  may result.
The compooLtion  of investsent  between  trad--ble  and  non-tradeable  goods
is also  affected  by a  real  depreciation. An Lncrease  in the  relative  price  of
traded  relative  to non-traded  goods (if  believed  to be permanJnt)  will
ancourage  investment  ln the  traded  geodo  sector  and  depress  it with home  goods
activities. The  magnLtudes  of these  eff :ts  will  depend  in part  on the
cifferences  in  the intensity  of  use  of  imported  capltal  and  intermediate  goods
between  the  two  sectors.
The net impact  of these  sectoral  effects  on aggregate  private  investment
also  depends  on the  relatlve  size  of the  traded  goods  sectors. In  economies
with a large  export  sector,  such  as Korea,  a devaluation  may  be expansionary
very quickly.
Empirical  country  studies  on the impact  of a real  devaluation  on private
capital  forma-  on  show  a  short-term  contractionary  effect  followed  by  an
expansLon. Thus,  a J-type  dynamice  characterizes  investment  after
devaluatLon. 6 Regarding  the evidetce  from  panel  data studies  of investment,
some  show  a negative  effect  of devaluation  on investment,  while  others  flnd
S  A real  depreclation  may also  have  adverse  supply-side  effects  that lead
to a contraction  in  output,  such  as the increased  real  cost (in  terms  of
domestic  goods)  of imported  inputs  and  the  rise in  working  capital  costs
(because  of increased  interest  rates).
6 Individual  country  studLes  that consLdez  the lmpact  of devaluation  on
private  Lnvestment  are Branson  (1986)  for  Kenya,  Musalem  (1989)  for  Mexico  and
Solimano  (1989)  for  Chile.10
that the variability of the real exchange rate --  rather than its level --  is
a  more important  determinant  of private  investment. 7
From  the  perspective  of designing  adjustment  policies,  it is important
to be aware  that  the combination  of restrictive  demand  policies  and  real
depreciation  may have a  greater  recessionary  bias  than  expected  under  the
standard  assumption  (often  rejected  empirically)  that a  devaluation  is
expansionary  in the  short  term.  In this  case  private  investment  (in  addition
to consumption)  may temporarily  be squeezed  after  a real  depreciation.
3.2  Structural  Reforme  (Liberalization)  and  Private  Investment
The  other  important  component  of adjustment  programs  is structural
adjustment  and liberalization  policies. They  are  chiefly  oriented  to
improving  the  quality  of resource  allocation,  and  therefore  their  main impact
will occur  in the  medium  and  long  rAn.  This  section  briefly  reviews  the
impact  of three  liberalization  policies on private  investments  (i)  trade
liberalization;  'ii)  financial  reform;  and (iii)  privatization  and  business
deregulation.
Trade  Liberalization
Trade  liberalization  is central  in  most structural  reform  programs
supported  by the World  Bank.  It is aimed  at improvin4  resource  allocation  by
puahing  domestic  prices  toward  international  prices  so as to reflect  the  true
scarcity  value  of goods  and  services. Trade liberalization  policies  often
involve  the elimination  of quotas  (and  other  non-price  barriers  to trade)  and
a reduction  in tariffe.
Import  protection  tends  to increase  the relative  price  of goods  that use
a scarce  resource  intensively  (capital,  in  developing  countries)  so that
implicitly  the production  of goods  intensive  in  the use  of the abundant
7  Mulil-country  econometrLc  studies  of investment  in LDCa  aret  Greene
and  Villanueva  (1990): Faini  and  de Melo (1990)  and  Serven  and  Solimano
(1992)  for  a multi-regional  sample;  Larrain  and  Vergara  '1991)  for  East Asia;
and  Cardoso (1991)  for  Latin  America.11
resource  (labor)  is taxed. Reducing  import  protection  should  lead  to a
contraction  in capital-intensive  activities  and  an increase  in labor  intensive
ones.  In that  respect,  a  reduction  in investment  may be expected  after  trade
liberalization.  An increase  in the  productivity  of investment  may  compensate
for  the  possible  reduction  in  the  volume  of investment  as  capital  starts  to
flow  to activities  where  resources  have higher  productivity  (the  sectors  with
comparative  advantages).
If  the reform  under  trade  liberalization  is not  fully  credible,  the
investment  response  may be affected. The  private  sector  may perceive  the
trade  liberalization  as a temporary  policy  that  has  a significant  probability
of being  reversed  (to  the former  regime  of higher  protection). The  reversal
may  come (among  other  reasons)  because  of the need  to raise  fiscal  revenues  or
because  a cut in tariffs  led  to an upsurge  in imports  that could  not  be
financed. In  this context,  private  investment  may  not respond  at all or even
fall.  The  chief  reason  is that  private  investors  do not  want to commit  to
physical  investment,  which  is largely  irreversible,  unless  they are confident
the new  trade  regime  will remain  in place. Under  uncertainty  and  a lack  of
policy  credibility,  the  rational  investor  may  prefer  to shift  to liquid  aseets
(e.g.,  foreign  exchange)  that  provide  a cushion  against  changes  in the
structure  of domestic  incentives  following  a reversal  in  the trade
liberalization.  Clearly,  those  who invested  in physical  assets  for  activities
that looked  profitable  under  a  more liberal  trade  regime  are  the first  to lose
in  a return  to protectionism.
Financial  Reform
Financial  reform  seeks  to improve  the domestic  capital  market  by lifting
the  controls  over interest  rates,  allowing  more freedom  for  entry  and exit  of
financial  intermediaries,  and  eliminating  quantitative  controls  and subsidies
on credit. The combination  of positive  real interest  rates  and  liberalized
financial  systems  is expected  to improve  the  allocation  of credit  toward
activities  with higher  rates  of return,  a shift  that  would  improve  the  average12
efficiency  of investment. In addition,  higher  (or  at least  positive)  real
interest  rates  should  mobilize  savings.
The  experience  with financial  liberalization  is  mixed.  Chile,  Argentina
and  Uruguay  tried  it in the  mid-seventies,  but the  process  led  to an
overexpansion  of financial  intermediation  centered  around  financial
instruments  with short  maturities  and  high returns  rather  than around  long-
term capital  formation. Chile increasing  domestic  (and  external)  indebtedness
and  very  high  domestic  real interest  rates,  that  ultimately  led  to a financial
crisis  in 1982-83  that  required  massLve  bail  outs  by the central  bank of
troubled  financial  intermediaries,  overindebted  enterprises  and households.
Paradoxically,  private  investment  boomed  in the  second  half  of the 1970.  in
Chile (see  figure  2), in spite  of the  very high  real interest  rates.  However,
much  of that investment  was debt-led,  and,  as  mentioned,  many private
investors  had  to be bailed  out  during  the crisis  of 1982-83. In the aftermath
of the crisis --  the second half of the eighties --  the financial sector in
Chile  performed  better  as real interest  rates  receded  to more  moderate  levels,
financial  supervision  and  regulation  were strengthened,  and  very important  the
central  bank  cleaned  the  bad loans  from  the  portfolios  of commercial  banks.
in contrast  with  the initial  phase  of financial  liberalization  in  Chile,
in Korea  the financial  reform (started  in  the  mid-sixties)  fared  much better.
Korea  avoided  the  excesses  other  countries  experienced  with financial
deregulation  and achieved  an increase  in  the rates  of savings,  investment  and
growth.
The scarce  empirical  evidence  on the impact  of positive  higher  real
interest rates  on the productivity  of investment  indicates  that the  effects
are relatively  slow  to  operate,  and  are  more important  over  the  medium  and
long  run.  In addition,  the interest  sensitivity  of domestic  savings  seems  to
be rather  low. 8
8  See  Dornbusch  and  Reynoso  (1989).13
Privatization  and  Dereculation
A change  in the  ownership  of productive  assats  does  not  represent  new
investment,  that is,  the creation  of new  productive  capacity. However,
privatization  may  affect  both the level  and  efficiency  of investment  in  more
indirect  ways.  On the  one hand,  privatization  may involve  the introduction  of
new  management  techniques  and  more productive  technologies  into  the productive
unit  being  privatized. Those  changes  are  expected  to increase  the  efficiency
of capital. Moreover,  privatization  policies  may be part  of a broader  package
oriented  to increasing  the role  the  private  sector  plays  in the  economy  by
creating  a more "frLendly  environment"  that  encourages  capital  formation.
Deregulation  entails  lifting  the barriers  to entry  and  exit and
licensing,  permissions  and  other  bureaucratic  impediments  to resources
reactlng  to the new incentive  structure. In  that sense,  deregulation  seeks  an
enhanced  supply  and investment  response  by making  institutional  and legal
changes  in line  with  price  signals.
3.3  Delays  in  the  Response  of Investment  to Adiustment: The  Value  of
Waitina  and Failures  of CoordLnatLo
Private  investment  is  very sensitive  to uncertainty,  and  to changes  in
both policies  and  the  rules  of the game.  That  uncertainty  follows  directly
from  the irreversible  nature  of most investment,  which  can  be viewed  as a sunk
cost,  because  capital,  once  installed,  is firm-  or industry-specific  and
cannot  be put to productive  use in a different  activity  (at  least  not  without
incurring  a substantial  cost). The decision  to undertake  an irreversible
investment  in an  uncertain  environment  involves  the  exercise  of an  option  --
to wait for  new information  that  might  affect  the desirability  and  timing  of
the investment.  Clearly,  waiting  has  a value  associated  with the new
information  relevant  to the  decision  to invest. Nevertheless,  this attitude
of "wait  and see,"  while  rational  from  the  viewpoint  of the individual
investor,  may have adverse  consequences  from  the view  point  of the
sustainability  of the  adjustment,  which  requires  a resumption  of growth  to
gain social  logitimacy.14
Economic  instability  may have  different  roots:  it  may be induced  by
exogenous  shocks  such  as a deterioration  in external  conditions  or it  may  be
policy-induced  by frequent  changes  in  the rules  of the  game and in  the  general
orientation  of policies. It  may be also a "chronic"  feature  in economies
where  theme  elements  have  interacted  over a  protracted  period  of time.  Among
other  manifestations,  chronic  inetability  is  often  reflected  in  hlgh and
unpredictable  inflation  rates,  which  are  usually  matched  by high  relative
price  variability. From  the  perspective  of adjustment  programs,  attaining  a
sizable  investment  response  after  relative  prices  are  changed  is harder  in
countries  with a long  history  of instability.
As mentioned,  a very important  source  of uncertainty  is  the imperfect
credibility  of policy  reforms. This  uncertainty  is related  to the  public's
perceptions  about  both the internal  consistency  of the adjustment  program  and
the  government's  willingness  to carry  it  out despite  the implied  social  costs.
Unless  investors  view  the adjustment  program  as fully  credible  in both senses,
the  possibility  of a future  policy  reversal  will  be a key  determinant  of the
investment  response. An "irreversible  mistake"  would  result  if  policy  were
reversed. In conclusion,  when investment  is irreversible,  policy  uncertainty
can have  very adverse  consequences  for  private  investment. 9
Thus, if credibility  is low,  stabilization  and adjustment  may  entail
large  social  and  economic  costs  --  since  the investment  response  will be
insufficient  to offset  the  contractionary  bias often  present  in policies  of
demand  restraint. The result  will  be a  persistent  recession  until investors
become  confident  that  the adjustment  measures  will  be maintained. This
pattern  seems  to be present  in the  experience  of several  countries  undertaking
economic  reform  examined  in section  4.
9  The adverse  impact  of uncertainty  on private  investment  in  LDCm has
been empirically  verified  in several  recent  studies  (see  Solimano  1989;  Faini
and de Melo 1990;  Lopez  1990;  and  Serven  and Solimano  1992).15
Hence,  although  setting  the  right  economic  incentives  may  be a
precondition  for  investment  and  growth,  it  does  not guarantee  them. 10 In
practice,  there  is  a  coordination  problem  in  atomistic  markets  that  can  mean
private  investment  fails  to respond  to apparently  attractive  business
opportunitieu. 11
It is important  to emphasize  that,  in  practice,  policy  reversal  is an
endogenous  outcome,  since  current  private  sector  decisions  affect  future
policy  actions  and  ultimately  determine  the  sustainability  of the  adjustment
policy. This  point  can  be illustrated  by an example  where  the economy  starts
an adjustment  program  in  which  confidence  is low (the  high-confidence  scenario
is  provided  below).  In  this situation,  a large  real  depreciation  of the
exchango rate --  implemented at the outset of an adjustment program --  will
fail  to attract  investment  to the  tradeable  sector. The only  likely  result
will be a redistribution  of income  from  labor  to capital  (and  to agro-
exporters);  in addition,  because  the  depreciation  may  not  be sufficient  to
compensate  for  the lack  of credibility,  the increased  profits  will be
reflected  in increased  capital  flight. Social  pressure  (labor,  unlike
capital,  is highly  immobile)  and  balance-of-payments  problems  may  eventually
force  a.policy  reverpal,  that  wQu%d  confirm  the initial  skepticism  of private
investors  and  the labor's  lack  of enthusiasm  in the  program.
The alternative  scenario  entails  high  confidence  at the  beginning  that
allows  a healthy  investment  response,  which in  turn  validates  the adjustment
program  in  terms  of higher  growth  and social  support. Thus,  there  are  two
10 Obviously,  high  credibility  would  speed  the investment  response  and
reduce  the costs  of adjustment. An important,  related  issue  here  is the
choice  between  gradual  and  abrupt  stabilization. The former  would  set
initially  modest  objectives,  which  could  be achieveid  with near certainty,  in
order  to build  the  government's  reputation. The latter  would  start  with an
overadjustment  (e.g.,  an overdepreciation  of the  exchange  rate)  to frontload
the incentives  to resource  reallocation  (but  also  the costs  of the
adjustment).
11 The reason  in an externality  that  creates  a  wedge  between  the social
and  private  returns  to investmentt  higher  aggregate  investment  helps  sustain
the  adjustment  effort  and therefore  result.;  in  higher  returns  to investment,  a
mechanism  that the individual  investor  will ignore.16
possible  outcomes,  and  the final  result  of the  adjustment  measures  may be
either  higher  growth  and fast  recovery  (adjustment  with growth)  or protracted
stagnation.
Some Implications  for  Policy
This review  of the literature  highlights  some important  implications  on
the impact  of macro  policies  and structural  reforms  on private  investment. In
economies  starting  from  a situation  of overexpansion  before  beginning  economic
reform,  macroeconomic  restraint  will often  involve  an initial  contraction  in
private (and  public)  investment,  which is  precisely  the  pattern  of investment
response  observed  in  the  initial  phase  of  an  adjustment  program.
Structural  reforms  are  expected  to  enhance  the  productivity  of
investment,  and  this  improvement  may  compensate  over  time  (at  least  partially)
for  the initial  adverse  impact  on the  volume  of private  investment  associated
with  macro adjustment. However,  it is important  to bear in  mind that  the
productivity-enhancing  effects  of structural  reforms  often  take time  to build
up.
The above  diecussion  also highlights  the  problems  posed  by a lack  of
policy  credibility  and  by uncertainty  in general  in  triggering  a substantial
private  investment  response  to  adjustment  policies.  Under  uncertaLnty,  the
value  of  waiting  increases  and  thereby  delays  the  response  of private
investore  to a program  of economic  reform  (the  delay  may  also correspond  to a
failure  of coordination). The  real challenge  ie  then to design  adjustment
programs  that  reduce  thie  waiting  period  and  break  that initial  self-
fulfilling  skepticiem  (or  pessimism)  to make the  outcome  of "adjustment  with
growth"  a reality. Policy  interventions  in this  regard  may take various
forme:  a  government  may  launch  a  program  of  (sound)  public  investment  ln
infrastructure  to  start  an  otherwise  stagnant  system  moving.  Other  policies
to  boost  investment  are  debt  reduction,  adoption  of  a  free  trade  agreement,17
and  domestic  deregulation,  all  of which  enlarge  the  perceived  set  of
opportunlties  to the private  sector  12
4.  The  Experlences  of Countriso  with Adiuutment  and  Reform:  The  Resvonse  of
Private  Investment
This section  looks  at the response  of private  investment  in  countries
that have  adopted  comprehensive  and  sustained,  programs  of economic  reform.
The economies  considered  have implementeds  (i)  successful  macroeconomic
stabilization,  that  has reduced  and stabilized  inflation;  and (ii)  structural
reforms  in  the direction  of market  liberalization,  removal  of large
microeconomic  distortLons  and  changes  in  the  regulatory  environment  faced  by
the  private  sector.  1 3 The  countries  studied  are  Chile,  Mexico,  Thailand,
Ghana  and  Bolivia.
Chile:  A *Mature"  Reformer
Chile  initiated  a comprehensive  set  of structural  reforms  and
macroeconomic  stabilization  in  the  mid-1970s. For  this analysis,  Chile  has
one  major  advantage  over other  economies  that  have followed  similar  policies
in terms  of content  and intensity  (e.  g.,  Mexico,  Bolivia  and  Ghana):  more
time  has  elapsed  since  the  reforms  were  launched  so  that  the  perspective
within  which  to  judge  the  policies  and  their  effects  on  private  investment  is
better.
In 1975,  when Chile  initiated  the  more  comprehensive  reforms,  the
economy  exhibited  large  macroeconomic  imbalances  in  the  form  of  high  inflation
12  While  transitory  investment  incentives  appear  to  be  the  most
appropriate  tool  to address  the investment  externality  involved  in  the "lack
of investment"  scenario,  in practice  they risk  destabilizing  public  finances,
which  often  are  a  key  element  in  adjustment  programs.
13 The  ot of countries  chosen  is  by no means  exhaustivel  rather,  it is
intended  to illustrate  the  different  patterns  of response  by private
investment  to adjustment  policies.  Korea  offers  another  clear  example  of
successful  adjustment.18
rates  and  a  large  fiscal  deficit.  14 Those  macroeconomic  imbalances  were
corrected,  and  gradually  Chile  achieved  moderately  low inflation  (by  Latin
American  standards). The structural  reforms  adopted  in the second  half  of the
seventies  included  the  elimination  of price  controls  and  subsidies,  a drastic
program  of trade  liberalization,  financial  reform,  privatization  and sweeping
regulatory  changes  (all  adopted  under  authoritarian  political  setting). In
addition,  the  commitment  to structural  reforms  along  free  market  lines
remained  quite  strong  throughout  the  period.  1 5 The  democratic
administration  that  took office  in  early  1990  committed  itself,  to  maintaining
these  policies,  but  with  more emphasis  on social  equLty  and  more balanced
relations  between  labor  and capital.
The response  of private  investment  to the stabilization  cum
liberalization  program  of the  mid-1970.  was surprisingly  strong  (see  figure
2).  The share  of private  investment  in  GDP went from  5.3  percent  in 1971-75
to 11.2  percent  in 1976-81. In contrast,  public  investment  fell from  10.6
percent  in 1971-7S  to 5.8  percent  in 1976-81. Several  hypotheses  may  explain
the response  of private  investment  in the  aftermath  of reform  (and  some
puzzles  remain). First,  the  political  economy  was important. The  country
went from  the "Chilean  Road to Socialism"  program  of President  Salvador
Allende  in 1970-73  which  involved  large-scale  nationalization  and  deepened
land  reform,  to the  radical  free  market  experiment  launched  in 197S  under  the
military  regime. The  private  sector  responded  forcefully  to the  new economic
program  offered  by the  military,  which  assured  full  respect  of private
property,  deregulation  of markets  and  tight  political  control  (e.g.,
repression)  of pol';ical
14  Corbo 198S  and  Solimano  (1991)  for  a discussion  of the  reforms  adopted
in the  Chilean  economy  in  the last  two  decades.
iS  The crisis  of 1982-83  put some  of these  policies  under  heavy  stress.
Some reversals  took  place,  such  as increases  in  tariffs  and direct
intervention  of the financial  system. However,  as the crisis  receded,  tariffs
were lowered  again,  and  the financial  system  was  gradually  deregulated,
although  with  strengthened  supervision.Figure  2
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opposition  and  the labor  unions. Second,  the reduction  in public  investment,
which  went beyond  infrastructure  investment,  apparently  crowded  in  private
investment. Moreover,  many  of the  enterprises  nationalized  under  Allende  were
returned  to their former  owners  or privatized  after  1975.
one of the  puzzles  in  the strong  response  of prlvate  investment  in  that
period  is that it coincided  with  a period  of very  high  real interest  rates  --
over 25  percent  per  year in the  second  half  of the 1970s.16
In  the 1980.  private  investment  followed  closely  the  economic  cycles of
the  period.  It boomed  in  the  early  eighties,  although  its  composition  tilted
strongly  toward  non-traded  sectors  --  residential  construction,  structures,
and  commercial  buildings  --  following  the  real  appreciation  of  the  peso  at  the
time and  the  massive  capital  inflows.  That  outburst  of private  investment  was
unsustainable,  however,  as it followed  signals  of profitability  --  climbing
prices  of non-traded  goods,  real  estate  and  land  --  that clearly  represonted  a
departure  from  the fundamentals.  This  episode  clearly  shows  that not  every
boom of private  investment  is sustainable  and  sound.
During  the crisis  of 1982-83  investment  fell  by more  than 10  percentage
points  of GDP  with respect  to 1980-81. Then,  between  1984-86  came  the "second
phase"  of the  cycle  of private  investment,  a period  in which  the recovery  was
still  elusive. The  third  phase  of sustained  private  investment  recovery
started  after  1987 (see  figure  2).  The  growth  performance  of Chile  was strong
in  the second  half  of the 1980s,  with GDP rising  at an annual  rate of 5.5
percent  between  1986_90.17
The recovery  of private  investment  and  growth  after  the deep crisis  of
1982-83  took place  in an environment  of relative  macroeconomic  stability  with
16 However,  given  the  massive  rescue  operation  undertaken  by the state
in 1982-83  on the internal  and  external  debt acquired  by the  private  sector,
the real interest  rate  effectively  paid  by the  private  sector  at the  end  was
much lower.
17  SeN  Corbo  and Solimano  (1991)  for  an analysis  of the  post  1984
recovery  in the  Chilean  economy.
Solimano  (1990)  provides  an econometric  analysis  of the behavior  of
private  investment  in  Chile  in the 1980s.21
moderately  low inflation  and  fiscai  discipline. Moreover,  the  recovery  was
helped  by a reduction  in  real interest  rates (from  25 percent  in 1982-85  to 8
percent  in 1986-90)  and  by low  real  wages.  In  addition,  its  composition
redirected  to the tradeable  goods  sector  following  a large  real  depreciation
of the  exchange  rate (see  table  3).
On the external  side,  Chile  enjoyed  an improvement  in the  terms  of trade
following  a  bonanza  in copper  prices  starting  in 1987,  and its  foreign  debt
was reduced  by more than 30  percent  by the late  1980s  (with  respect  to 1981)
as a share  of both GDP  and  exports.
Chanaes  in  the Composition  of Investment  after  Reform: Some  Emvirical
Evidence
The focus  here has  been chiefly  on the impact  of adjustment  on the level
of private  investment. In  Chile,  the  trade  reform  and  the  evolution  of the
real  exchange  rate  affected  the comgooition  of investment  in at least  two
ways: (i)  with reEpect  to the  allocation  of investment  across  sectors  of
economic  activity;  and (ii)  in  term  of the  composition  of investment  between
machinery  equipment  and  structures. In addition,  some  new  empirical  evidence
on  the  dynamics  of  capacity  creation  and  capacity  destruction  in a  period  of
structural  change  is  discussed.
Following  the  trade  liberalization,  Chile  experienced  an  initial
reduction  in  the relative  share  of the  manufacturing  sector  in  GDP along  with
an increase  in the share  of agriculture. Moreover,  within  the  manufacturing
sector,  the share  in  manufacturing  value  added  of several  activities  with high
effective  rates  of protection  (before  trade  reform)  fell  while  that  of other
activities  with lower  protection  expanded  as a result  of a shift  to and
directed  sales  to export  markets (Levy  1991).  In addition,  the expansion  of
non-traditional  exports  following  the  reduction  in  tariffs  and  the  real
depreciation  of the  peso  after  1975 led  to a relative  decline  in the  share  of
copper  in total  exports  from  around  70 percent  of GDP in 1974  to nearly  45
percent  in  the late  1980s.,!  1  |  l  I  'U
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Theue  shifts  clearly  suggest  a change  in  the  output  mix  away from
capital-intensive  sectors  ln  manufacturing  (specifically,  the sectors  that
enjoyed  higher  protection  before  the  trade  reform)  and  away from  copper,  an
actlvity  that li  highly  capital-intensive.
Another  observed  change  in the  composition  of total  investment  involved
investment  in equipment  (machinery)  and  structures  (buildings);  in  partlcular,
the data uhow  an increase  in  the  relative  share  of investment  in machinery  and
equipment  ln total  Lnveatwsnt  and  GDP  after  1974  and  therefore  a decllne  ln
the  share  of lnvestments  ln structure  (table  4).
Recently,  De Long  and Summers  (1991)  detected,  for  a cross-sectLon  of
developed  and less  developed  countries,  signlficant  differences  in  the
contribution  to GDP between  investment  in equipment  and in structures.
Investment  in machinery  and  equipment  made a significantly  greater
contributlon  to GDP  growth  than  did investment  in structures  in the  De Long
and Summers  (1991)  study. Hence,  this  compositional  shift  would  increase  the
productivity  of investment  in  the aggregate.
The dynamics  of capital  formation  and  destruction  in an economy  facing
changes  in the structure  of incentives  and  the  regulatory  environment  take
place  through  exit,  entry,  productivity  and scale  effects. In recent  study,
Roberts and  Tybout (1990)  decompose  the  change  in annual  manufacturing  output
between  1978  and  1985 in  Chile  according  to these  components. The authors
found  that roughly  50  percent  of the average  annual  change  in  output  over  the
period  1978  and 1985  was  explained  by the entry  of firms  --  the 'creative"
side  of Schumpeter's "creatlve  destructiona  process. Within  this  entry
effect,  nearly  half  corresponded  to new  entrants  and  the  other  half  to
switches  from  old activities. The remainder  of the positlve  change  in annual
output  was explained  by productivity  and  scale  effects  of incumbents,  entrants
and  exlters.
The "destructLve"  side  of the  Schumpeterlan  process  corresponds  to the
exit  of firms:  enterprLies  that dLiappear  and  others  that swLtch  to a new24
Table 4
invesumet in Machinery  and Equipment  in Chile
Shae in  Share ian  GDP
"AI inveamet  (percentage)
(percentage)
1974  27.5  4.8
1978  46.4  6.7
1980  45.4  8.0
1985  32.2  4.8
1988  40.1  6.8
Source:  Chile, National  Accowu, Centrd Bank, 1990.25
activity.  The authors found that the magnitude of the "destructive" part of
changes in productive capacity was significant in Chile. This finding raises
the question of the extent to which adjustment programs must favor changes in
resource reallocation through significant "destruction' of capacity (shock
treatment) versus a more gradual process of reallocation of capital.  There
are several reasons why massive capacity destruction (e.g.,  through
bankruptcies) may be suboptimal.  They may entail a  large initial increase in
unemployment that is socially costly.  The financial system may fail to
distinguish between insolvent versus non-liquid borrowers.  In addition, the
evaluation of which firms must go bankrupt needs to be made at equilibrium
prices that reflect real scarcities and that are sustainable over time.  In
Chile, many firms went bankrupt because of an unsustainable appreciation of
the exchange rate (early eighties) and/or abnormally high real interest rates.
To sum up,  Chile's experience of a decade and a half of economic reform
shows  that  the  response  of  private  investment  was  substantial  after  the
launching of reform in the mid-seventies, although the boom in private
iniestment was clearly unsustainable: excessively tilted toward the non-traded
goods sector and financed by borrowing, it ultimately led to a financial
crisis in 1982-83.  In the eighties, early on a  new cycle of private
investment took place but collapsed in the crisis of 1982-83 to be followed by
a  delayed recovery after 1987.  That recovery was helped by the realignment in
key relative prices (the real exchange and real interest rates), the
consolidation in macro stability and structural reforms, the improvement in
copper prices and a policy of easy money in 1988-89, a period that coincided
with a plebiscite and general election.  The political consensus in the early
1990s over a development model that assigns the private sector a  greater role
in the economy seems to be giving enough guarantees to private investors to
keep them investing at home in a context of moderate increased taxation and
some realignment of the relations between labor and capital that followed the
post-Pinochet regime.26
4.1  The  Cases  of Mexico  and  Thailand
Mexico  and  Thailand  provide  examples  of a  more  delayed (mainly  in
Mexico),  although  still  considerable,  respnnee  of private  investment  to
adjustment  policies  adopted  in the  1980e (see  table  5 arn figures  3 and  4).
ox.  average,  in  these  two  countries  the share  of private  investment  in  GDP rose
by more than 2.5  percentage  points  between  1982-85  and 1986-90.
Following  the  windfall  gains  from  the discovery  of oil in the seventies,
Mexico  en;aged  in  cycle  of fisjal  expansion,  currency  appreciation  and large
debt  accumulation  that  came to a sudden  halt in 1982.  In that  year the  country
embarked  on a drastic  program  of macroeconomic  adjustment,  comprising  demand
restraint  and  real  depreciation  of the exchange  rate.  Since  1985,  the
government  has  deepened  these  policies  with  trade  reform,  deregulation  and
liberalization.  The  coverage  of  quotas  was  reduced  from  100  percent  of  all
non-oil  tradeable  goods  produced  to  less  than  17  percent  at  present,  with  a
similar  trend  with  tariffs  (Van  Wijnbergen  1991).  In  addition,  the  tax  system
was  reformed,  regulations  on domestic  and  foreign  investments  were  phased  out
and  the financial  system  was liberalized.  Moreover,  a severe  program  of
disinflation  was launched  in late  1987  that combined  additional  fiscal
adjustment  with incomes  policies  to abate  a stubbornly  high rate  of
inflation. 1 8
The  cycle  of  private  investment  in  Mexico  resembles  the  one  detected  for
Chile  in  the  1980s  although  with  a  longer  investment  lag:  private  capital
formation  started  to decline  in 1981,  a  trend  that  lasted  until  1983;  then  a
"plateau"  developed  lasting  up to 1987;  and  since  1988  a more sustained
increase  in  private  investment  started  to take  place.  Thus,  with adjustment
initiated  in 1982,  it took  nearly  six  years  for  private  investment  to resume.
The long lag  in the  recovery  of private  investment  in  Mexico  seems  to
have been  related  to various  factors:  tight  credit  policies  and  high  real
interest  rates;  considerable  excess  capacity;  the  perceived  fragility  of the
18  An analysis  of the stabilization  program  launched  in late  1987  appears
in  Ortiz (1991).27
Table  S
INnVE5;lENT AX{;)  OROWH DIN  maXICO  AND THAILAND
Mexico  Thailand
1978-81  1982495  1986-90  1978-41  1982-85  1986.90
ToWa  invegueg
(upsc  MtofGDP)  24.2  16.8  16.8  25.9  24.9  25.2
Private invealm
(o perl  of GaDP)  13.7  10.3  12.6  17.4  16.4  18.9
Public  invegment
(aas  peratofGDP)  10.5  6.5  4.2  8.S  8.5  6.3
Growtb rate of GDP
(percen per yar)  8.7  0.3  1.2  6.6  6.1  8.1
Souw:  IPC,  Mal.Figure 3
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balance-of-payments  in the Lnitial  years  of reform;  the debt  overhang;  and  the
drastic  decline  in  public  investment  (nearly  9  percentage  points  of GDP
between  1981  and 1989),  with a uignificant  part  of the decline  consisting  of a
cut in investment  infrastructure.  The acceleration  in  the recovery  of private
investment  since  1988  seems  to reflect  a gradual  rebuilding  of confidence  in
the consolidation  of the reforms,  associated  partL_ularly  with  the success  in
bringing  down inflation. Other  factors  were the  announcement  of a debt
reduction  deal in the  context  of the  Brady  initiative  in 1989,  the hastening
of privatization  and  deregulation  and  the initiative  for  a free  trade
agreement  with  the US,  which  drastically  enlarges  the  opportunities  for
domestic  and foreign  investment.
Thailand  is  a case  of gradualism  in  macro  policies. In 1984,  the
government  devalued  the  exchange  rate  by 14  percent,  supported  by fiscal
restraint.  In the  early  eighties  Thailand  had  undertaken  other  reforms  in
several  areas:  agriculture;  energy;  public  enterprisee;  trade;  and  changes  in
the fiscal  incentives  for  investment. In contrast  to other  adjusting
countries,  Thailand  decelerated  its  rate  of GDP  growth,  oomewhat,  to 6.1
percent  per  year between  1982  and 1985.  Thereafter,  growth  resumed  forcefully
at an annual  rate  of 8.1  percent  (1986-90). Between  1984  and  1986,  private
investment,  fell  by nearly  3  percentage  points  of GDP,  but then  recovered
quite  strongly  (see  figure  4).  Macroeconomic  adjustment  in  Thailand  was non-
inflationary,  and large  fiscal  imbalances  were avoided. These  factors  were
undoubtedly  supportive  of  a  high  and  stable  pace  of  capital  formation.
Regarding  the  impact  of  reform  policies  on  the  composition  of
investment,  there  was  a  steady  increase  in  the  share  of investment  in
equipment  and  machinery  in  total  investment  after  the  mid-seventies.  In
addition,  the  structural  change  in  manufacturing  did  not  occur  with  an
absolute  reduction  in the  level  of output  for  the  deelining  sectors.
Summing  up,  Mexico  is a case  of major  macroeconomic  adjustment  and
radical  reform  in the  eighties. While  private  investment  suffered  initially
in the adjustment  program,  it recovered  slowly  afterwards. After 1988  the31
recovery  of private  investment  gained  more  momentum,  helped  by the
consolidation  of the reforms,  the debt  reduction  deal,  the  deepening  of the
privatization  and  deregulation,  and  the initiative  for  a free  trade  agreement
with  the  United  States. In contrast,  Thailand  undertook  gradual  reforms  that
implied  a less  dramatic  rupture  with previouu  policies  and  pursued  this
process  in a context  of macroeconomic  stability  with some  adjustments  in  the
exchange  rate and fiscal  policies. Consequently,  the  cycle  of private
investment  wau  milder.
Bolivia  and  Ghana
In Bolivia  and  Ghana,  the  response  of private  investment  to adjustment
policies  has been  modest. These  two small  economies  have annual  levels  of per
capita  income  below  US$600  and  a serious  lack  of human  capital  and physical
infrastructure.  Their  industrial  base is small;  mining,  services  and
agriculture  generate  the  bulk of national  income. Bolivia  suffered  mounting
economic  instability  and  negative  GDP growth.
In the first  half  of the 1980s, this  process  culminated  in
hyperinflation  in  the first  eight  months  of 1985.  In  August  of that  year  the
government  launched  a drastic  and successful  anti-inflationary  program  that
produced  a decline  in inflation  from  more than  25,000  percent  in 1985  to an
average  annual  rate  of 16.5  percent  in  the  period  1987-90  (see  table  6).  The
government  followed  the  anti-inflationary  program  with a series  of structural
adjustment  policies  that included  trade  liberalization  (tariffs  rates  were
reduced  after  1985  to a range  between  5  percent  and 10  percent)  and  the
elimination  of most of the system  of price  controls,  state  subsidies  and
guaranteed  prices. Public  sector  prices  were adjusted  to reflect  opportunity
costs, the ceilings  on interest  rates  were removed,  and  domestic  and foreign
commercial  banks  were allowed  to receive  deposits  denominated  in dollars.
Ghana  provides  a  particular  case  in  Africa  of  far-reaching  economic
reform  along  free  market  lines.  In  April  1983,  the  government  launched  a
comprehensive  plan of economic  stabilization,  oriented  toward  correcting  the32
Table 6
INVEST1ENT AND  GROWTH  IN BOLIVA AND GHANA
Bolivi  Gana"
197841  1982-45  1986-90  19781  1982-85  1986-90
Total  investment
(as perent  of GDP)  15.6  7.2  5.5  9.6  7.6  11.0
Private inveaunst
(aspercentofGDP)  6.2  3.4  2.1  5.1  5.9  5.8
Public inve
(a  perent  of GDP)  9.4  3.8  3.S  4.5  1.8  5.2
Growth mte of GDP
(percent  per year)  0.8  -2.8  1.5  0.7  0.6  5.6
Sorce:  iFC,  real.
Table 7
MAIN  ECONOMIC  INDICATORS  FOR BOLIVIA  AND GHANA
Bolivha  Ghaa
Annual  Averge  19781  1982-45  1986-90  1978W1  1982-4S  1986-90
lnfation
(GDP  deflator)  24.1  2,680.9  16.sa  S9.5  62.2  33.4
Fiwal balane
("  perceat of GD)  8.3  20.4  5.4  6.2  2.3  -0.8
Curr. acboun baance
(a  prce  of GDP)  8.6  6.9  7.9  0.6  2.2  S.6
Real intert  rate
Leding  (cen)  NA.  -71.2  16.3  -33.3  -25.4  -1.9
Ternm of trade
(1980-100)  85.1  87.9  56.4  113.9  87.0  8S.4b
Real exchange ate
(1980-100)  100.8  62.6  136.2  94.8  76.0  374.1b
Noew: An inae  in  ral  exchange  t  index  man  a ra  depreciation.
a  1987-90
b-1986-89
Soure:  Word Bank, country report,  and BESD.33
major  macro  imbalances  and  main micro-distortions.  By late  1986,  these
policies  were deepened  by a set  of  policies  oriented  toward  increasing  the
reliance  on market  mechanisms  and  reducing  the  role  of the state  in  economic
activity.
In Bolivia,  the  decline  in  private  investment  stopped  after  the  reform
program  was  begun  in 1985,  but it  remained  very depressed  afterwards  (2.1
percent  in  the  period  1986-90,  figure  5).19
In Ghana,  the share  of private  investment  in  GDP  was 5.8  percent  in  the
period  1983-90,  up from  4.8  percent  in  the  period  1970-82. There  was  an
initial  increase  in private  investment  after  1983,  followed  by a downturn
after  1986  and  a mcre forceful  recovery  after  1989. Moreover,  the increase  in
investment  was concentrated  mainly  in gold  and  cocoa (Kapur,  et al. 1991).
Ghana  managed  to grow at an annual  rate  of 5.4  percent  between  1983-90
(and  5.6  percent  in  the  period  1986-90). This  growth  rate  was a significant
improvement  over  the rrevious  trends  of average  negative  growth  during  1970-
82.  In the  period  1983-90,  the  growth  was driven  mainly  by the industrial
sector  (it  grew  at 8.6  per year)  and  the services  sector  (with  a rate  of 7.5
percent  per  year)  .2  In Bolivia,  the rate  of growth  of GDP was 1.5  percent
per  year in 1986-90,  still  below  the  rate  of population  growth. Nevertheless,
this level  was a favorable  reversal  of the  trend  of negative  GDP growth  of the
19 The  nominal  investment  share  in  nominal  GDP was around  4 percent  of
GDP in  that  period.  The  discrepancy  between  nominal  inveotment  ratioe  was
attributable  to  a  sharp  increase  in  the  real  price  of  investment  (the  ratio  of
the  investment  deflator  to  the  GDP deflator)  in  the second  half  of the
eighties,  associated  with a large  real  depreciation  of the exchange  rate.  The
higher  component  of  imported  machinery  and  equipment  in  total  investment
relative  to  the  intensity,  of imported  capital  goods  and inputs  in GDP (on  the
production  aide)  made  the  real  price  of  investment  very  sensiti7e  to  changes
in  the  real  exchange  rate.
20  The  fastest  growing  sector  in  the  economy  was  wholesale  and  retail
trade  (in  the  services  sector),  which  grew  at an annual  average  rate  of 11.1
percent  between  1983  and  1990,  (Kapur,  etal 1991).Figusre4  5
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firut half of the eighties, before the launching of the adjustment
program. 21
In terms of the causes of the low response of private investment in
Bolivia, on the macro side, three factors can be identified as important:
*  The relatively large fiscal deficit (it averaged 5.4 percent of
GDP in the period 1986-90), which tended to crowd out private
investment.
*  The real interest rates, both in peso and dollar-denominated
assets.22 These hampered the recovery of capital formation, as
confirmed by firm-level evidence for Bolivia (see  below).
*  The sharp deterioration in the terms of trade in the period 1986-
90 with respect to 1982-85.  The negative income, fiscal and
balance of payments effects of an adverse terms of trade shock in
general depress investment. 23
The high real interest rates for dollar-denominated assets held in the
Bolivian banking system, ae  well as the fact that around 80 percent of the
assets and liabilities of the commercial banking system with the private
sector were denominated in foreign currency, have been attributed to an
underlying credibility problem (Morales 1991; Calvo and Guidotti 1991).
A recent eurvey looked for qualitative information at the firm level in
Bolivia to shed light on  the weaknese of the private inveetment response in
the aftermath of the reform.24 The survey covered 80 enterprisee operating
21 The aggregate figures on growth may hide some poeitive eectoral supply
response after adjustment.  Bolivia's non-mineral exports grew at an annual
average rate above 35 percent per year in the period 1987-90, a trend that
contributed to export diversification.  See Mierau-Klein and Page (1991).
Calvo and Guidotti  (1991)  computed that 20 months after the start of
the stabilization a one dollar investment in Bolivia (in a dollar-denominated
account) would have yielded, ex post, a return of 50 percent over the yield of
investing one dollar at the LIBOR in the same period.
23  See Cardoso (1991) and Warner  (1990) for econometric evidence on the
negztive investment effect of a deterioration in the terms of trade.
24  The survey, addreesed directly to the managers of enterprises
solicited their perception on the main constraints to increasing capacity
utilization and investment in their firme.36
in agriculture  (14),  mining  (7)  and  manufacturing  (59). The survey  identified
six  main  obstacles  to a recovery  of private  investment:  (1)  According  to the
survey,  the  main constraint  on :nvestment  in  all sectors  was  the high  real
cost of credit  and/or  restricted  access  to bank  credit  (around  40 percent  of
investment  outlays  by the firms  in  the sample  were financed  by bank  credit).
The higher  cost of fLnancing  war a  more binding  constraint  for "outsider"
firms  (namely,  firms  with no representation  on the  board.s  of commercial
banks).  (2)  There  was a lack  of adequate  infrastructure,  particularly
transportation  (railways  and  roads),  a factor  that is  more important  for
exporting  firms.  (3)  The high  cost  of energy  was another  important  obstacle
to production  and  investment  for  ail  firms.  (4)  The regulatory  constraints,
such  as barriers  to entry,  expansion  and  exit,  were seen  considered  as a
relevant  obstacle  for investment  according  to the firms  interviewed.
Licensing,  control  systems  and  permissions  are  costly  and  time-consuming,  and
then  affect  small  enterprises  more  than large  and  established  ones. (5)
"Insufficient  domestic  purchasing  power"  was considered  to be an important
additional  constraint  on investment  in agriculture  and  manufacturing
particularly  (the  survey  reported  an average  rate  of  capacity  utilization  in
manufacturing  of  60  percent  in  1986-88  for  firms  classified  at  the  four-digit
ISIC level).  Finally,  (6)  "high  labor  costs"  appeared  at  the lower  end  of the
ranking  of the  constraints  on investment  for  firms  in Bolivia.
Regarding  the  response  of  private  investment  in  Ghana,  it  is  unclear
whether  the  macroeconomic  environment  was  unsupportive.  An  important  effort
of  fiscal  adjustment  was  undertaken  in  the  program  of  economic  reform  (the
fiscal  deficit,  excluding  external  assistance,  was less  than 1  percent  of GDP
in 1986-90),  and  inflation,  although  still  moderately  high  --  around  33
percent  in 1986-90  --  clearly  did  not  reach  the  extreme  level  that patently
destroys  capital  formation.  Moreover,  Ghana  enjoyed  ample  external  financing
and aid in the second  half  of the eighties,  and  the current  account  deficit
increased  from an average  of 2.2  percent  of GDP in 1982-85  to 5.5  percent  of
GDP in 1986-90. A factor  that  may  ezplain  the low  rates  of private  investmentFigure  fb
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in Ghana is the large part of foreign financing that went to finance an
increase in public investment (publlc investment went up from 1.8 percent of
GDP Ln 1982-85 to 5.2 percent of GDP in 1986-90).  Greater proportions of that
external financing could have gone to finance private investment, although it
is widely recognized that the country needs an important improvement in its
domestic infrastructure to, among other things, promote private investment.
At the microeconomic level, a recent survey covering 31 large firms and
82 micro and small enterprises points out that the main constraint --  almost
regardless of firm size --  on a strong supply and investment response in
recent years in Ghana has been the lack of both working capital and credits to
finance capacity expansions another factor identified as important for current
production and inveztment was the availability of raw materials although this
may be related to the lack of working capital.
Insufficient internal demand for large and small firms, in response to
the import liberalization was also considered to be an important constraint in
the survey.  Regarding the effect of business regulations, medium- to large-
scale  firms  responded  that  the  regulatory  onvironment  became  more  supportive
of  business formation and had been a  significant contribution of the program
of economic reform for  boosting private investment.  The experiences of
Bolivia and Ghana clearly point out that establishing market-oriented rulea,
may, by itself be insufficient to convince the private sector that real
investment is worthwhile.  In a low-income economy without fully consolidated
institutions to assure medium-term political and economic stability, economic
reform is definitely a difficult task.  The difficulty in getting a quick and
sizeable private investment response to the new policies is just another
manifestation of that point.
5.  Summina-Un: A Cycle of Private Investment durLna Adiustment
The empirical evidence reviewed here suggests that a cycle of private
investment takes place during the implementation of adjustment programs.  The
cycle, in a stylized way, is characterized by three phases:39
*  Phase I:  The starting conditions are important: in economies in
which the adjustment policies were preceded by a period of domestic
expansion --  Mexico, Chile in the early eighties, and Thailand --  private
investment tended to decline, initially, after adjustment.  That decline may
last around one or two years.  In economies in which the adjustment policies
were preceded by a period of decline Ln economic activity and investment --
Bolivia and Ghana --  adjustment entails an initial increase in private
investment.
*  Phase II:  After the initial contraction or expansion, private
investment reaches a plateau with no substantial increases {or declines) in
private investment.  That period lasted three years in Chile in the mid-
eighties and four years in Mexico.  In Bolivia, private investment has not yet
gone, beyond this phase.
_  Phase III:  This period is characterized by a sustained increase
in private investment.  In Chile it began after 1987, in Mexico and Thailand
after 1988.
This cycle shows that, in general, in economies subject to major changes
in policy regimes, private investors are slow to engage in irreversible
investment decisions  Private investors develop an attitude of 'wait and see'
until gradually they become convinced that the new rules and institutions
brought about by the program of economic reform, are consolidated.  In
addition, when individual investment decisions are interdependent, some
mechanism for coordination is needed to avoid a low investment trap after
adjustment.  The length of the waiting period varied from country to country -
- it was shorter in Thailand and longer in Mexico, Bolivia and Ghana --  but
the common pattern was a delay of several years in the take-off of private
investment following adjustment (table 8).  The analysis also shows that high
real interest rates, substantial excess capacity, a fragile balance of
payments, the debt overhang, and large cuts in complementary public investment
are important factors that tended to delay the sustained recovery of private
investment.40
Table B
CYCLE  OF PRIVATE  INEMEN
Pas  Ia  Pne  D  Pem
Country/  Sustained
stating  initial  Intia  *P1tma*  expansion
adjusment  expanson  coDuoCn  (no. of yeas)  (oo. of years
program  (no. of year)  until 1990)
Chile
1975  1  6'
1982  2  3  4
Mexico
1982  2  4  3
Thaibnd
1984  2  3
1985  1  4b
1983  2  5b
'  Unil 1982.
b Until 1990.
S3ce:
1.  The data on investment  covers 41 developing  countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.  The
data on public investment  includes investment  by the central  government and public enterprises; the
private and public investment  shares in GDP are the ratios of real investment  over real GDP.  This is
to control for the increase in the real price of capital associated  with the real depreciations  of the
exchange  rates and many developing  countries in the 1980s.41
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